In Karl Marx’s essay On the Jewish Question (1844), he makes the argument that unbridled economic activity is an inherent consequence of liberalism. To motivate this point, Marx uses Judaism as a metaphor for the egoism that is latent within so-called “secular” nations, which he maintains never genuinely cease to be religious. Marx then shifts the point of contention from “Jewish emancipation” to universal emancipation, that is, the emancipation of all individuals from the economic superstructures of liberal society. My paper argues that Marx’s vision for Jewish emancipation is limited by the preclusion of Jewish Existentialist thought. First, I explain Marx’s method of connecting the Jewish question to his overarching project of emancipating the modern individual into a state of “species-being.” Next, I focus the discussion back to Jewish identity and contest the counterclaim that Marx’s vision of universal emancipation and the cultural aspects of Judaism can be reconciled. In my critical analysis, I invoke the perspective of Martin Buber, a Jewish existentialist philosopher who contends with the infamous Jewish question by offering an alternative viewpoint of what constitutes Jewish liberty.
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Liberalism is a political philosophy that was formally introduced in the 17th-century to optimize individual autonomy by granting state-protected equal rights. In the 19th-century, what became known among Western European intellectuals as the “Jewish question” challenged the merits of liberalism, as Jewish communities were forced to make a trade-off between dispelling the exclusive aspects of their religious identity and receiving national rights that would protect them against two millennia of exile, political discrimination, and antisemitism. In sum, the Jewish question asks the extent to which Jewish people must “give-up” their identity in order to be considered an equal citizen in a liberal society.
This paper critically examines Karl Marx’s understanding of Jewish emancipation in his essay On the Jewish Question (1844). Marx’s vision of Jewish emancipation is shaped in light of his later-developed historical materialist methodology, which maps the emergence of ideological constructs, such as religion, onto the individual’s socio-economic conditions. Although Marx is predominantly concerned with critiquing liberalism as a political framework — over and above discussing the nature of Judaism itself — Marx’s antisemitic rhetoric had substantive influence on how Jewish identity was regarded in the 19th-20th century. Considering Marx’s inadvertent influence on the rise of antisemitism in Germany, I will be critiquing the foundation of Marx’s characterization of Judaism from a philosophical perspective. First, I argue that Marx’s historical-materialist characterization of Jewish identity is hyper-reductive and fails to capture the “essence of Judaism” according to the principles of its own logic. Second, I argue that Marx’s vision of Jewish emancipation — which is shaped in light of his flawed construal of Judaism — is limited by the inability to reconcile the liberty for Jewish existentialist thought.
History of the Jewish Question
During the medieval and early modern periods, Jewish communities retained an anomalous status in Western Europe, perceived as being “in” but not “of” a given nation. Various Western European nations perpetuated Jewish alienation by confining Jewish communities to ghettos and depriving them of civic rights. Although particular advancements were made to promote integration, such as French Jewish citizens gaining national rights in 1791, these did not dissolve growing antisemitic attitudes in Western Europe.
The German expropriation of the Jewish question in the early 19th century shifted towards the radical position that overcoming antisemitism requires abolishing religious influence in politics. The term “Jewish question” was popularized by the “Young Hegelians”⎯a group of intellectuals, including Marx, who distinguished themselves by applying Hegelian criticism to the Christian state. Marx’s interest in the Jewish question was initiated by Bruno Bauer’s argument that Jewish communities could only achieve political emancipation if they waived their “particular” status as Jewish within the secular state. According to Bauer, the ostensible advantage of establishing a secular government was the treatment of all citizens in accordance with the impartial “Rights of Man.” When speaking of the Rights of Man, Bauer refers to the declaration set by France’s National Constituent Assembly in 1789. The declaration set universal rights that French citizens would be endowed with upon the establishment of the new republic. Bauer fell under the impression that Judaism was incompatible with the Rights of Man based on his interpretation of Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem (1783). Mendelssohn intended to argue that Jewish emancipation was harmonious with the scientific Enlightenment movement because Judaism is a system of laws rather than a collection of unsubstantiated “beliefs” that were incompatible with scientific advancement. Bauer’s point of contention was that Jewish laws could not claim sovereignty over Jewish citizens while co-existing with state laws, as the two legal systems may run into conflict.
Bauer’s concern about how a nation ought to compromise the particularity of a specific community is one that we still grapple with today. Specifically, in Western liberal democracies, there is ongoing tension between the establishment of universal laws and the diverse cultural identities of citizens. For example, there are only statutory holidays designated for the Christian holidays in the province of Ontario, even though Canada is home to a diverse range of religious communities. There is no obvious solution concerning how they would grant “official” holidays to various other religious festivals, given the number that would have to be considered — e.g., Rosh Hashanah, Diwali, etc. Assuming the Canadian economy would falter if they granted statutory recognition to all religious observations, the issue remains irresolvable unless religious statutory holidays are banned altogether. Bauer’s argument essentially suggests abolishing religious holidays, as it would resolve the contradiction between the particularity of individual religious groups and the universal laws of the modern state.
According to Bauer, granting distinct privileges to religious groups increases social fragmentation, thereby detracting from the goal of establishing unity. The advantage of being recognized by the state as a general citizen, rather than as a distinct minority group, is to secure non-discriminatory rights. Marx agrees with Bauer that demanding distinct “Jewish rights” paradoxically fails to address the cause of Jewish ostracization from society. However, Marx disagrees with Bauer that aiming for political secularism achieves genuine emancipation from religious influence. To motivate this point, Marx turns to the United States as a case study. In contrast to the “enlightened” European nations that enshrined Christianity as their national religion, in the United States, the freedom to exercise one’s own religious practice is codified in state constitutions. As Americans are endowed with the freedom for religious belief, one might expect that the United States would be the most “secular” nation, allowing them to overcome the religious prejudice which gives rise to antisemitism. Instead, Marx observed the exact opposite, as secularism in the United States coincided with massive Christian revivalisms, heightening the divisions between religious groups rather than overcoming them.
Jewishness As a Metaphor
In order to push the argument that American secularism fails to overcome religious influence, Marx relies upon harmful Jewish stereotypes — such as the avaricious Jewish moneylender — as a metaphor for the United States. He proclaims that the United States, though predominantly composed of Christian individuals, is “Jewish” in essence because its citizens are self-interested and worship money. Marx’s notion of Judaism is conceptualized in the same vein as his subsequently developed theory of “historical materialism”, insofar as he claims that cultural identity necessarily stems from the “production of the means to support human life.” According to historical materialist theories, the essence of Judaism can be distilled by examining the history of the Jewish community’s economic activity and their extraordinary resilience against political opposition throughout their history. For the purpose of this paper, I will omit detailing the manner in which Marx’s historical materialist characterization of Judaism inadvertently contributed to the acceleration of antisemitism in Germany, although this implication is important to recognize. Ultimately, Marx was unambiguously and indiscriminately critical of religion as a whole, infamously claiming that religion functions as the “opiate of the people.” Henceforth, I will review Marx’s characterization of the United Stated as “Jewish,” in explicit reference to the argument that Americans are self-alienated, religiously divided, and economically competitive.
How Liberalism Facilitates Self-deception
Marx characterizes Americans as deviating far from the path of universal emancipation because they are self-deceived by their “double-existence”. On the “political” side of her identity, the American regards herself as having equal rights and promoting the general interest of her community. However, when engaging in economic pursuits — what Marx calls “civil society” —she behaves self-interested, regarding others as a means to achieve economic ends. For instance, Marx claims that the right to own private property is fundamentally self-interested because it promotes the enjoyment of one’s fortune without concern for her community. Under this dual-identity framework, there is an intractable contradiction between her convictions in the economic and political spheres. According to Marx’s prognosis, the drive which propels her to be self-interested is essentially “religious,” as it mirrors the drive that Jewish people emanate when furthering the interest of their particular group. Thus, the religiosity enmeshed in the so-called “secular” state never genuinely dissipates. Instead, the religious spirit migrates from the political sphere to the civil society where it remains omnipresent.
Marx argues that Americans fail to be genuinely emancipated from religion because they operate under a veil of self-deception. He cites the perplexing observation made by Gustave de Beaumont that when the American businessman fails, he becomes a preacher; when the priest has a thriving ministry, he is a marvelous businessman. Marx emphasizes that the “priest-businessman” reflects a hypocrisy, failing to adhere to the Christian morality to which they subscribe. He uses the priest-businessman as a metaphor for a secular state, one that “cannot affirm the reality of its existence without lying to itself.” Correspondingly, Marx argues that American’s self-deception is harmful because it casts them under the delusion that they are “free,” inasmuch as they have the capacity to express an egoistic will. The conniving priest-businessman might believe that he is more liberated than the authentic Christian priest because he has the power to manipulate others for his own economic gain. However, according to Marx, emancipation only occurs when individuals are no longer governed by the “objective power of things” — whether that be money or God. In the so-called secular state, money essentially replaces God and functions as an abstract “alien” force that individual’s worship. Thus, the so-called “liberties” Americans are endowed with are illusory, as they are unliberated from the frenzy of the cultural and material elements which determine the content of their life.
Uncovering the Species-being
According to Marxist theory, full-fledged emancipation⎯on both political and economic dimensions⎯involves one recognizing the essence of oneself as species-being. The term “species-being” simply refers to how Marx believes human beings are meant to live, including the ability to be in close relation to nature and engage in activities that are intellectually stimulating. What makes humans a unique species, compared to plants and other animals, is that we are self-conscious. Our capacity for self-consciousness requires us to seek fulfillment both in a biological and existential sense. Marx adopts Hegel’s claim that we become unhappy when our consciousness is divided against itself, causing us to become separated from our essence. According to Marx’s analysis of the unhappy modern individual — which is embedded in his critique of capitalism — we have become severed from our essence as species-being because capitalism requires us to deny ourselves our natural means of fulfillment. Consequently, our innate drives become perverted such that we willingly pursue unnatural capitalistic goals.
When referencing the “species-being” in On the Jewish Question, Marx argues that the Americans’ economic self-interestedness is not “natural.” Rather, such egoistic behaviour is symptomatic of the modern workers’ miserable predicament and the contradictions enmeshed in her dual identity. Marx’s association between Jewish emancipation and the social consequences of capitalism will be explored in the following section.
Antisemitism Amid Capitalism
According to Marx, when individuals are self-alienated, they fail to recognize how they are victims of the same causes of suffering as fellow species-beings. A contemporary example of a society’s failure to recognize one another as “species-being” is reflected by the growing number of antisemitic individuals in the United States. I will examine antisemitism in light of Jean Paul Sartre’s definition: individuals who attribute all of their misfortunes to the “presence of Jewish elements in their community.” Sartre’s characterization resonates with the predicament in America, considering that Americans who identify as antisemitic are more likely to be impoverished compared to economically prospering liberals who do not identify as such. For the antisemite, “blaming the Jewish person” transposes their material problems — such as lack of access to job opportunities — to their abstract concept of “Jewish person.” Yet, the antisemites’ reaction has nothing to do with Judaism as a religion. Rather, Sartre claims that “if the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him.” Sartre’s point is that when people suffer economically, they will arbitrarily find a common enemy that justifies their predicament.
From a Marxist perspective, the motivation to assert one’s identity as “antisemite” fulfills the same self-deceptive function as asserting one’s religious identity, as both fail to uproot the problem of self-alienation from its socio-economic origins. In Marx’s words, “religious suffering is a reflection of actual suffering,” revealing the interdependence between religious belief and suffering caused by liberal society. Marx argues that when individuals are subject to self-alienation, clinging onto religious ideology for refuge is counter-productive because it serves as a distraction from one’s material world-problems. Similarly, the antisemites cling to their prejudiced beliefs for refuge, yet this too is a distraction of economic struggles. All in all, Marx believes that modern society will only be fully “emancipated” if citizens can recognize their shared belonging to a community of species-beings, rather than through the superimposed stratifications of Christians, Jewish, or various other sub-groups.
Choosing Between Universal Emancipation and Preserving Jewish Identity
I interpret Marx’s “Jewish question” as presenting Jewish people a choice between dispelling their religious identity⎯for the sake of uncovering the “species-being”––and achieving emancipation qua Jewish person. My position contrasts with Marxist scholars who interpret Marx as ambivalent towards the theological and cultural aspects of Jewish identity. As argued by Shlomo Avineri, Marx merely uses Judaism as a metaphor to make his argument about the inherent flaws of liberalism. If we interpret Marx as solely concerned with critiquing liberalism, then the cultural and theological aspects of Judaism can be foreseeably reconciled in Marx’s overarching project of universal emancipation.
According to my interpretation, attempting to reconcile Marx’s vision of universal emancipation with the preservation of Jewish identity fails to recognize the religious and cultural facets of Judaism as direct extensions of the Jewish people’s historical circumstances. The historical dimension of Jewish identity is characterized negatively by Marx, as he claims that Judaism stems from “practical need.” The “practical need” is surviving political alienation through economic autonomy, and Marx believes that Jewish people adhere to superficial religious laws which self-justify their economic goals. In a charitable reading of Marx, it is evident that his ultimate pre-occupation resides with the universal emancipation of the species-being. In light of that goal, Marx views the theological and cultural aspects of Judaism as distractions from the heart of the matter of societal emancipation. In this vein, Marx tends to be interpreted as claiming that reconciling Jewish identity is either: (a) not possible, because “Judaism” is merely a symptom of a socio-economic landscape; (b) possible, but a fruitless enterprise that Jewish people are not genuinely interested in. In the following sections, I will argue that (b) fails to consider how Jewish identity is inextricably bound to the Jewish community’s subjective relationship to their historical conditions. The notion that Judaism has a historical element is a view held by both Jewish theologians and Marxists. Thus, Marx’s vision of Jewish emancipation does not allow for Jewish people to liberate their identity as Jewish.
Re-Evaluating Jewish Emancipation
When considering the Marxist perspective of Jewish emancipation, it is important to recognize that Marx is not the chief authority of determining the relevant aspects of Jewish identity. A substantive criticism made against Marx’s historical materialist analysis is that it fails to authentically capture the Jewish essence according to the merit of its own logic; in which case, Marx’s understanding of what it means for a Jewish person to be emancipated demands reconsideration. Notably, the philosopher David Ruben claims that if we accept the historical materialist position of reducing Judaism to the economic purpose of moneylending, then the Marxist must show how the Jewish community’s role in moneylending was inextricable to the functioning of the European economy. To motivate this criterion, Ruben makes the analogy that when the biologist claims that “the purpose of the heart is pumping blood to organs in the body”, they articulate how the operation of the heart is inextricable to that function being satisfied. According to that standard, it is not enough for the Marxist to make the uncontentious observation that the Jewish people survived religious persecution during the Middle Ages by engaging in money-exchange. However, if the Marxist wants to claim that the purpose of Judaism is money-exchange, they must show why Western European economies were reliant upon Jewish communities for performing that function — in the same way as the body is reliant on the inherent characteristics of the heart to pump blood.
Marx makes no attempt to provide a substantive argument which authentically captures Jewish history because he relies heavily on stereotypical assumptions which exaggerate the Jewish community’s economic influence — i.e., “The Jew, who may be entirely without rights in the smallest German state, decides the destiny of Europe.” Ruben responds that Marx’s depiction is inaccurate, considering the degree of competition Jewish merchants faced from non-Jewish commercial rivals such as the Italian Lombard. In support of Ruben’s criticism, the historian Julie. L Mell explains that the “Jewish moneylender” trope was widely popularized in the 18th-century as a philosemitic narrative. According to Mell’s analysis of politics in the Middle Ages, there were too many socio-political disadvantages of being Jewish during the Middle Ages for that to be an advantageous economic device. Therefore, for factual reasons, we cannot accept Marx’s distillment of Judaism to simply “huckstering.” If huckstering was genuinely the Jewish people’s vocation, then they would have been far more successful in that pursuit by aligning themselves with the Christian hegemony or by dispelling their religious identity.
Even though Ruben criticizes Marx’s hyper-reductionist characterization of Jewish identity, Ruben does not think that Marx’s historical materialist analysis is wholly irrelevant when understanding how the Jewish people survived persecution throughout the Middle Ages. For instance, it was clear that the Polish King’s decision to welcome Jewish immigration in the 13th-century stimulated the Polish economy and that the Jewish people were largely excluded from anything but exchange-related occupations. To that extent, there was a correlation between Poland’s economic activity and the survival of the Jewish population, which Marx’s historical materialist analysis successfully captures. Ruben’s argument is that Marx’s immediate observations of modern European Jewish people were not substantive enough for Marx to motivate his interpretation of two millennia-old Jewish beliefs as serving that same purpose — i.e., the belief in the Israelites as “chosen” to form a covenant with God.
The Personal Jewish Question
In light of Ruben’s counterargument, I will argue that if Judaism is not aptly characterized by Marx’s historical materialist account, it follows that Marx’s depiction of Jewish emancipation fails to liberate the Jewish people as such. I will expand on this concern by invoking the perspective of the 20th century Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. According to Buber’s Jewish existentialist perspective, Judaism is multifaceted, meaning that it cannot be sufficiently reduced to a singular theological, political, or a historical perspective. In brief, Jewish existentialism is a modern intellectual movement which invokes 19th-century existentialist philosophy to provide Jewish people with the liberty to self-determine their own relationship to Judaism. Quite obviously, Marx was uninterested in emancipating the “existentialist Jewish person,” as he believed that the Jewish people would be emancipated in all the relevant ways once they were able to recognize their essence as species-beings. Beyond this point, I will argue that Buber’s Jewish existentialism is incompatible with Marx’s vision of universally emancipating the species-being — as it involves the liberty to express one’s distinct religious identity rather than collapsing all identities to one homogenized mass as “species-being.”
Buber’s perspective on the Jewish question was shaped by the Holocaust, marking the transmutation of the Young Hegelian’s explorative reflections on liberalism to Adolf Hitler’s abominable “Final Solution.” Post-WWII, reference to the Jewish question took on a new gravity, considering its unequivocal connotations with antisemitism and the Nazi regime. In spite of this connotation, Buber re-claimed the Jewish question as a symbol of the individual Jewish person’s subjective overcoming of the atrocities inflicted upon their people during the Holocaust.
In Buber’s On Judaism (1967), he writes, “the personal Jewish question [is] the root of all Jewish questions, the question we must discover within ourselves, clarify within ourselves, and decide within ourselves.” Buber’s Jewish question illuminates the Jewish person’s internal contradiction between the quest for integration within and beyond the Jewish community and their unique path to self-discovery. On one level, Jewish identity is constituted by a “passive” force, involving accepting and living according to the commands passed down from God two-millennium ago. On another level, the Jewish person contains a “creative” force that enables her to self-determine her relationship to Judaism within her current social context. On top of the struggle enmeshed within her dual identity, the Western European Jewish citizen is alienated from her homeland, pressured to preserve whatever cultural semblance she possibly can in the foreign nation that she simultaneously calls “home.”
It is important to note that Buber does not naïvely depict the social integration of the multifaceted Western European Jewish citizen as a straightforward project. Keeping the Young Hegelians in mind, Buber addresses Marx’s concern that the Jewish person is torn by a contradiction between her dual identity as Jewish and her identity as a citizen in a Western European nation. The difference is that Buber embraces the tension, as he believed it was inherent to the struggle for authentic self-understanding. He proudly claims the “schism of our [the Jewish person’s] existence” is deeply embedded within the individual, but the only way “out” is to attain a conceptual grasp of oneself in relation to the complex heritage and community encompassed by Judaism. Buber likens the process of self-discovery to “an individual wrestling with himself” as one grapples with all the political, historical, and subjective elements at play.According to Buber, a Jewish person’s ability to learn and embrace her religious heritage is a form of liberty and lies at the heart of the “personal Jewish question.” If the self-identifying Jewish person must “overcome” her identification with Judaism — an identity whose legitimacy has been questioned for centuries — she would forfeit the irreplaceable liberty to actualize herself based on how she understands herself to be, which would defy authentic emancipation. Thus, Jewish existentialism complicates Marx’s notion of what it means for a Jewish person to become emancipated.
Perhaps a Jewish Marxist would be tempted to claim that Buber’s “personal Jewish question” poses no conflict to Marx’s project On the Jewish Question. They might contend that, even if Marx undermined the essence of Judaism when making his critique of liberal society, making a strong argument about “what it means to be a Jewish person” was obviously not the point of his essay. To this end, one can reconcile the thrust of Marx’s argument while leaving the contentious topic of what constitutes Jewish identity aside.
In response, I would argue that Buber agrees with Marx’s historical materialist analysis of Judaism in the sense that he interprets subjective aspects of Judaism as inherent extensions of the Jewish people’s socio-political conditions. According to Buber, the Jewish person’s history of constant political persecution, from Egyptian enslavement all the way to the Holocaust, plays an indispensable role in her self-understanding. Although Buber’s “personal Jewish question” is characterized as subjective, he is not implying that one’s Jewish identity simply emerges from the individual’s imagination. Instead, Buber offers an authentic characterization of a Jewish person’s path to self-understanding, which involves developing her own relation to her ancestors, history, and immediate community. Even when the Jewish people’s socio-economic circumstances radically change — as they have throughout their history — Buber perceives the Jewish person’s capacity to self-identify with her history as a form of liberty. The significance of one’s liberty for self-identification is further echoed by Ruben when citing Matthew 4:4, “man does not live by bread alone.” Ruben’s point is that beyond fulfilling physical goals, individuals have the innate desire to construct a higher-order purpose which gives life meaning. Historical materialism may allow us to discover how one’s interpretation of life’s meaning is contingent upon socio-economic circumstances, but we have no reason to believe we shall — or can — forgo that higher-order need entirely.
The reason why Buber’s proposition would be contentious for Marx is because he believes antisemitism is an inherent consequence of the Jewish person’s social distinctiveness. As well, Marx’s notion of the “species-being” demands ubiquitous assimilation to the extent that we no longer consider an individual’s identification as Jewish as constitutive to her identity. Regardless of the positive implications of universal assimilation that a Marxist wants to defend, the call to assimilate the Jewish people as species-beings makes an irreconcilable position against Buber’s vision of Jewish existentialism. If we take Buber’s conception of Jewish existentialism seriously, then we must accept the distinctiveness of the individual Jewish person in spite of the political tensions which may arise.
Jewish existentialism poses an irreconcilable challenge for Marx because it illuminates a way in which his overarching perspective on universal emancipation constrains Jewish liberty. The Young Hegelians, such as Bauer and Marx, perceive Jewish people as fundamentally oppressed in all the relevant ways, so long as they stand in religious opposition to the totality of the state. According to their perspective, there is nothing liberating about pronouncing oneself as Jewish. Quite the opposite, they perceive the preservation of religious identity as a roadblock for one’s genuine emancipation which itself fuels antisemitism by rendering the Jewish person as “the other.” Buber’s analysis of the Jewish question begs to differ, arguing that to be a liberated Jewish person means to absorb the “grandeur of self-affirmation.” Even if a Marxist criticizes Buber’s conception of liberty as superfluous, they still force the Jewish community to choose between the type of liberty that Buber advocates for and the universal emancipation of species-beings.
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* Ariel LaFayette’s research interests are in the phenomenology of religious experience and ethical debates in the philosophy of mind. She is particularly interested in how topics in the philosophy of religion can be re-interpreted to shed light on progressive solutions to contemporary ethical problems. Ariel is also an editor of Pensées Canadiennes — the national philosophy undergraduate journal, and the editor-in-chief of Noesis — UofT’s philosophy undergraduate journal. She is currently in the final year of her undergraduate degree, double majoring in philosophy and cognitive science.
 Nancy Green, “Socialist Anti-Semitism, Defense of a Bourgeois Jew and Discovery of the Jewish Proletariat” (2009).
 Wendy Brown, “Tolerance and/or Equality? The ‘Jewish Question’ and the ‘Woman Question”, Differences, (2004).
 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”, The Marx-Engels Reader (1944), 43.
 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem (1783).
 Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article 9 (1776).
 Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, The Marx-Engels Reader (1880), 700.
 Abram Leon, The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation (1950).
 David Leopold, The Hegelian Antisemitism of Bruno Bauer, History of European Ideas (2012).
 Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of the Philosophy of Right, The Marx-Engels Reader (1844), 54.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 34.
 Ibid, 35.
 Ibid, 49.
 Ibid, 38.
 Ibid, 52.
 Ibid, 45.
 Ibid, 45.
 Paul Santilli, Marx on Species-Being and Social Essence, Studies in Soviet Thought (1973).
 Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), 126.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 27.
 Raphael Ezekiel, “An Ethnographer Looks at Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups,” American Behavioral Scientist, (2002).
 Jean Paul Sartre, The Anti-Semite and the Jew (1946).
 Marx, supra note 9, at p. 55.
 Dennis Fishman, “The Jewish Question about Marx,” Polity (1989).
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 26.
 David Ruben, “Marx and the Jewish Question” The Socialist Register (1982), 211.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 26.
 Ruben, supra note 26, at p. 209.
 Julie. L Mell “The Myth of the Jewish Moneylender” (2017), 76.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 52.
 Ruben, supra note 26.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 27.
 Ibid, 48.
 Martin Buber, On Judaism (1967), 42.
 Ibid, 43.
 Ibid, 54.
 Ibid, 42.
 Ruben, supra note 26, at p. 220.
 Marx, supra note 3, at p. 28.
 Ibid, 27.
 Buber, supra note 34, at p. 44.