HOW TO ORIENT ONESELF IN WHITE JURISPRUDENCE: UNIVERSALITY, RACE, AND THE LAW
[➡︎ watch the accompanying video]
Amadou Korbinian Sow*
In David Foster Wallace’s Authority and American Usage, the author has his fictional doppelgänger explain the pitfalls of language and race to a student of color. The student, whom Wallace describes as “bright and inquisitive as hell and deficient in what US higher education considers written English facility,” is told:
I don’t know whether anybody told you this or not, but when you are in a college English class you’re basically studying a foreign dialect. […] In class – in my English class – you will have to master and write in Standard Written English, which we might just as well call ‘Standard White English’ because it was developed by white people and is used by white people, especially educated, powerful white people. […] I’m respecting you enough here to give you what I believe is the straight truth.
Wallace goes on to write that in his opinion “some of the cultural and political realities of American life are themselves racially insensitive and elitist and offensive and unfair, and that pussyfooting around these realities with euphemistic doublespeak is not only hypocritical but toxic to the project of ever really changing them.” He recounts that “a couple of students I’ve said this stuff to were offended – one lodged an Official Complaint – and that I have had more than one colleague profess to find my spiel ‘racially insensitive.’ Perhaps you do too.”
Naturally, nowadays we are appalled at the way Wallace phrases his advice. It is patronizing and decidedly politically incorrect. Still, my thesis will be that Wallace is more right than we initially think – remedying racism will entail partaking in “white” structures, such as “white” language and thought and a certain frankness in dealing with this reality is ultimately helpful to the project of emancipation.
This essay consists of three parts.
I begin by examining how our vocabulary, our language, forms the extent of our world. In doing so, I will delineate a concept of whiteness as an abstract universality and explain how it pervades our language and thus our world. My interest here is in conceiving a counterpoint to whiteness that can both represent the lived realities of people of colour (POC) and challenge whiteness on its own terms of universality. To do so, I will draw on the recent work of the philosopher Zahi Zalloua who in turn invokes Slavoj Žižek in order to develop a theory of anti-racism.
Secondly, I will show how these theoretical concepts of white and non-white universality can help us re-orient the law and thus gain a manifestly practical dimension. My thesis is that jurisprudence, or, more specifically, German so-called “legal dogmatics” can be used as a lever to affect legal change towards true universality.
Thirdly, I will illustrate the practical yields of my proposed changes to jurisprudence using the example of German Police Law, before concluding in the abstract by referring to the Kantian notion of orientation.
II. Universality and Race
No thought is without perspective. When we think, we inevitably do so already “being-in-the-world.” Pure thought, unencumbered by spatial, temporal, and individual contingencies is unattainable. In the past, philosophers in the “Plato-Kant canon” experienced this limit as a deficiency that ought to be overcome. Nowadays, we are much more inclined to accept and perhaps even utilize it. By assembling a patchwork of different perspectives, we realize that each perspective can reveal its own truth.
These truths are shaped by language, by our vocabularies. As Richard Rorty put it, “all human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. […] They are the words in which we tell the story of our lives.” These individual vocabularies can overlap and constitute a symbolic social order that is fundamentally an order of shared vocabulary. This common symbolic order is the edifice of interpretation. Its brickwork is language.
1. Whiteness and Universality
Let us re-interpret Wallace’s essay from this vantage point. For POC (in Wallace’s case: black Americans), the edifice of language they find themselves in, the social order it constructs, is not entirely their own. Or, more precisely, POC inhabit two different worlds – one of their own which has no claim to universal hegemony and one of another’s making which has a strong claim to universal hegemony. From a POC’s point of view, both worlds are particular ones – the “POC” world as well as the “white” world. In both worlds, their own lived experience means something to them. Yet, in one world – the white world –, they are “habitually exposed” to a “hegemonic language,” a grammar of suffering that affects their whole “socio-symbolic being.” In Fanon’s poetically tragic words: “I came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an object among other objects.”
From the “white” perspective, that relation is a drastically different one. The white person’s lived experience is one of universality. Her language and her world are very much her own. So much so that its contingency becomes invisible to her.
That is what I mean when I refer to something as “white.” Whiteness is a standpoint that claims universality and neutrality for itself without necessarily doing so consciously. It simply takes up the mantle of normalcy. As a result, it is, as Sara Ahmed succinctly puts it, “invisible and unmarked,” it is “the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation.” Yet it is “only invisible for those who inhabit it, or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it, even when they are not it.”
That does not happen because white men plot the minutia of their supremacy in smoke-filled backrooms. Rather, where there is language, there are always processes at work that select and steer what can be said, what a vocabulary holds. In Foucault’s famous words: “In every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures.” These include procedures of inclusion and exclusion, of normalization and deviation.
In Germany, whiteness is particularly reliant on its purported absence. It is an entirely implicit concept because for years there has been virtually no challenge of the conception that being German and being white belong together. Or, more historically precise: after 1945, race as a category was systematically excluded from public debate. In retrospect, it seemed to us Germans as if the reality of race only seemed to enter German society with the rise of Nazism and then vanished along with it. This idea of the “Stunde Null”, the zero hour after WWII allowed us to ignore our role in the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and so on and so forth. In consequence, Germany has long struggled to admit to the fact that a multitude of different groups now inhabit its borders. An example of that struggle can of course be found in language: the word Germans initially used for migrants was “Gastarbeiter,” guest workers that were expected to return to their homeland once their work was done.
One may feel differently about that situation – some may understandably long for the imagined simplicity of older times where such plurality was not yet present – but its facticity cannot be denied.
Only recently – and here the American Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests have played a pivotal role – has the state of German consciousness become more open to its excluded other.
However, the German gaze across the pond can be a strange one. It is regularly bound up in a false dichotomy between either proclaiming the German situation to be the precise copy of the American one or the total inverse. In the case of BLM that means that Germans tend to either look at our political order as fundamentally racist (as the US order might very well be) or that they imagine themselves in blissful post-racial, enlightened Germany. The truth is, naturally, somewhere in between.
Hence, even as “white society” sensitizes itself to the plight of this other, it does so from its own standpoint. As Žižek puts it, whiteness remains – as the universal-neutral medium – “the place from which the truth about the others’ oppression is accessible.”
There is an evident danger in raising the attribute of whiteness. It lies in turning whiteness into what philosophers call a hypostatic abstraction. That means transforming what is merely a name for a social construct into an unchanging fact of being. If we were to do so, it would bring us to a conception that bears a frightening resemblance to the very racism we try to do away with. As Zalloua reminds us, it would lead us into “racist fantasies [that] teach us to see the social world as always already racially classified […] – locking individuals […] into their unconscious patterns of judgment and behavior, encouraging and ensuring toxic relationality with racialized others.” Instead, “[a]ny anti-racist discourse […] must strive not to naturalize/ontologize race and race-thinking and thereby perpetuate that which it seeks to contest.”
Žižek and Zalloua show us that to do so, not only do we need to change the way we conceptualize racism – we also need to change the way we conceive anti-racism. To this end, they sketch a vision where POC “will leave behind their particular identity, assume ‘being nothing’ and formulate their own universality different from the universality imposed by hegemonic white culture and politics.”
What is meant by this counterintuitive appeal to universality? Did we not just portray whiteness as universality? Is not the counterpoint to whiteness then caught up between a particularity that has no bearing for universality and a universality that would threaten the particularity’s potential for change? It seems we are stuck between a rock and a hard place.
2. Concrete Universality
Zalloua and Žižek show a way out of this conundrum by leading us through the very term we had determined as the problem: universality. They conceive of the difference between whiteness and its other not as the former being universal and the latter being particular. Instead, starting from Hegelian dialectics, they draw on Žižek’s development of two different notions of universality, abstract universality, and concrete universality.
Abstract universality “excludes rather than encompasses the contingency of the particular.” Concrete universality on the other hand is never complete “without including in itself the subjective position […] as the particular and contingent point from which the universality is perceived.”
So not only is every universality “haunted by a particular content that taints it”; every particular position is also “haunted by its implicit universality, which undermines it.” As Žižek writes:
[A] universality arises ‘for itself’ only through or at the site of a thwarted particularity. Universality inscribes itself into a particular identity as its inability to fully become itself: I am a universal subject insofar as I cannot realize myself in my particular identity – this is why the modern universal subject is by definition ‘out of joint,’ lacking its proper place in the social edifice.
That is precisely the case for POC. The non-white marks “the symptomal point of universality: although it belongs to its field, it undermines its universal principle.” Concrete universality reconciles the exception in the universal. It denotes the “unity of the abstract universal with its constitutive exception.”
Building on this distinction, Zalloua demonstrates how “race” as a category can be kept “out of joint, open, less fixed and away from identitarian investments.” To do so, he refers to Žižek’s decoupling of “difference from particularity”: race’s “difference is not on the side of particular content […] but on the side of the Universal.” This switch can lead to “a state where ‘a properly universal dimension explodes from within a particular context and is directly experienced as universal.’”
Now what does law have to do with all this? Why look at a specific, German version of jurisprudence when talking about race?
My thesis here is that the universalism of whiteness and the universalism of the law are analogous.
The fact of law’s medium being language might be raised against that. The texts of written law, the judgments of courts, and the musings of tenured professors – all of them rely on contingent vocabularies as their medium. Yet, law is one of the remaining institutions of our society that still needs to affirm its independence of such contingencies, even in the face of overwhelming proof to the contrary. The law is caught up in a difficult in-between, where simple historical facts attest to its historicity – laws can and usually will be changed or abolished at some point – but it needs to symbolically reaffirm and demonstrate its “eternity.” It does so by laying claim to universality. This claim is deeply enmeshed in the same abstract universality of whiteness I referenced earlier.
Jurisprudence, i. e. the discipline of law, plays a particularly important role in the construction of this abstract universality of law.
This is even more so the case for the German version of doctrinal jurisprudence that is called “Rechtsdogmatik”, legal dogmatics.
Legal dogmatics is a discipline that attempts to put order to law. Its function is to guide the practice of law. To do so, it conceives categories, differentiations, figures or principles. It is commonly described as a reservoir of knowledge for both jurisprudence and law in action.
It is highly inert and slow to take up change. In that sense it is structurally conservative. Dogmatics is bound to social expectancies that are in turn reproduced and fortified by the legal system.
We can already see that dogmatics is a quintessentially German project that confides in the powers of order and rationality. Nonetheless – or maybe even because of that – it pervades the entirety of German law. Regardless of where the law moves, dogmatics will have already moved there with it.
Dogmatic discourse is the medium by which law realizes its claim to universality and neutrality. Under the dogmatic gaze, everybody and everything seem equal – equal parts of a universal law. It thinks of itself – if it even thinks about itself – as purely descriptive and apolitical. In fact, it even needs to do so, otherwise some might question its squarely prescriptive influence that would suddenly be laid bare.
This enthusiasm for objectivity and universality turns law into an almost ontological entity. Although dogmatics rarely raises the claim to providing the universal answer, its vocabulary guarantees that its predications about law are clothed in a veil of objectivity. It never attests to the validity of such claims, and perhaps it cannot because doing so would destroy its ability to function
Through this purported neutrality, dogmatics gains a lot of influence and power. One dimension that seldom is addressed even in discussions critical of dogmatics is this connection to whiteness (understandably so, considering the lack of POC in German legal thought).
Evidently, the way I have laid out legal dogmatics bears striking similarity to the abstract universality of whiteness. Both hide their excluded particularity behind universality. Both affirm a certain status quo – both are reinforced by a static vocabulary and both fundamentally structure reality.
A one-dimensional perspective would simply point out dogmatics’ whiteness as a negative, pseudo-political effect. It certainly does have its valid reasons for doing so. I however believe it to be more useful from a non-white perspective to simultaneously mount a critique and a defense of legal dogmatics. This allows us to avoid the performative contradiction of critiquing law in its entirety and surrendering law’s power. It allows us to universalize jurisprudence. My aim is neither calling for its abolition nor leaving it entirely untouched. Rather, it is using dogmatics as a lever for the ends of concrete universality.
In doing so we can even measure up dogmatics against its own promise. As it is now, it remains behind its own possibilities. A truly universal dogmatics would encompass the non-white point of view (again, not as a particularity but as a concrete universality).
That would mean subversive change – not a critique that argues against dogmatics but rather a critique that argues through dogmatics. Thus, we turn critique itself on its head. Where before, we regretted that any critique that aims to challenge is weakened by the fact of its participation in the object of critique, we now cherish that aspect and see it as an opportunity.
Here again we should follow Zalloua’s position in that the “critical inventiveness [we need] lies not beyond the European legacy but through it. A more effective blow to white supremacy is to ‘deprive the whites of the monopoly on defining their own tradition.’” Concrete universality “appropriates key elements of the ‘white’ egalitarian tradition, redefines that very tradition, and transforms it […], obliterating the implicit qualifications which have excluded [POC] from the egalitarian space.”
2. Practical yields
In order to demonstrate how these theoretical insights can have practical effects, I will gesture towards one area of legal thought and practice where a non-white dogmatics could prove useful and fruitful – police law.
The German philosophers Vogl and Wolf have recently explored the role of angst for our modern societies, specifically for their policies and laws. They posit that angst has become the modern apriori of politics.
The German language knows two different words that are both encompassed by the English word “fear”: the etymologically close word “Furcht” denotes a fear that has a very tangible object, i. e. a fear that has good reason – we might think of a pursuer we’ve already glimpsed stalking us through the dark of night.
“Angst” on the other hand (lexically still present in English words like “anguish” or “anxiety”) describes a fear without a clear object and source Angst cannot be contested. It cannot be disproven – that is its very definition. When somebody tells you, he feels angst, you cannot deny that subjective feeling. Angst is always authentic. That is where Vogl and Wolf see its frightening potential as a legitimizing force of state authority.
In what they call politics of angst, the anticipation of potential danger grows boundless. The spellbound concentration on uncertain danger renders the uncertainty of danger even more frightening.
Addressing this pervasive angst replicates it. By trying to remedy it through security measures, angst is validated. The heightened perception of dangers and the desire for security are contingent on one another.
Transplanted into law, this process is inherently excessive. Law’s field of suspicion extends itself to no end (that is by the way a perhaps inherent property of law – it continually strives to usurp more parts of its outside).
Now, these were fairly abstract thoughts. However, in Germany, the consequences of such a politics of angst can already be observed. The police’s powers are being broadened beyond their former scope. Where German police laws had restrictive requirements for allowing preventive measures, these restrictions are generally being eased. The way this is done is through German law’s concept of “danger.”
“Danger” is the central concept in German police law. It is the general requirement for police to enact preventive measures. Yet, the way dogmatics nowadays determines whether such an inherently uncertain thing as “danger” is at hand, is through the officer’s subjective point of view. This subjectivation is a recent shift that has accelerated in the last three decades.
It means that the authorization of an officer to act under the uncertainty of danger rests – to a sizable extent – on him- or herself.
Conceptions of angst and imagery of menacing outsiders, always ready to commit minor or major crimes against proper society, inevitably shape the way officers will conduct themselves here – and that is entirely independent of any one officer’s “race.”
Still, here we would not stop in decrying this process as an authorization for racial profiling or police brutality against migrants or POC. Rather, we should point out where the specific conception of subjective danger undermines police law’s own promises of security and order under a pervasive politics of angst. As Žižek reminds us, “we can formulate the universal dimension only if we focus on a particular case which exemplifies it.” Here we can observe how, if we integrate the non-white into legal dogmatics, we might be able to effect general substantive change through law.
IV. Conclusion: Orientation Transfixed
To conclude, let me invoke the title of this essay: “How to Orient Oneself in White Jurisprudence” – we might ask: have we now learned how to do so? The faithful Kantians among you may have already recognized the title as a variation of Kant’s lesser known essay “Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?” – “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”.
For Kant, to orient oneself means finding your way in a foreign situation and realising what your possible courses of action are. Kant asks how an orientation in judgement can be found where intuition is unavailable as a guiding line. Our thought needs orientation precisely when it tries to reach realms beyond the knowable and yet cannot abstain from acting. In Kant’s philosophy, knowledge of the unknowable is a contradiction in terms. Hence, we need to realize how to act in these situations from elsewhere. But from where?
He solves this in a typically Kantian way: by putting the subject at the centre. He posits that a “subjective feeling […] anchors and enables accurate moral navigation.” This anchor is, in Kant’s words, a “feeling of a difference in my own subject.” The subject acts as the universal point of reference for experiencing all that is. For Kant, that means something ties us to reason even in a world that is oftentimes unreasonable and not entirely understandable.
Kant ultimately draws surprisingly political conclusions from this conception. He evokes the meaning of thought in community. Kant viewed orienting oneself as a common task. Its communality arises from universal principles with distinct political implications. Through this communality, reason is transformed from external authority to an intersubjective guideline that connects individual subjects.
Yet from a contemporary perspective, such a universality is unreachable if it remains conceived in the way Kant thought of it. The reason is that Kant’s conception in this case is equivalent to whiteness. If the background to universality is whiteness, it becomes the entire basis of social action. As we have seen earlier, if the subjects this intersubjectivity has in mind are white ones, true universality cannot be reached, only abstract universality is lies there.
As Ahmed writes, “whiteness is an orientation that puts certain things within reach.” In this orientation, non-whites merely “inherit the reachability of some objects.” “Whiteness might be what is ‘here’, as a point from which the world unfolds,” as the original point of orientation.
Nevertheless, the Kantian term of “orientation” may yet be helpful in the matter – though we will have to give it an un-Kantian twist.
At the time Kant wrote the essay, the word “to orient” was still a French loanword; it had not yet passed into German. Its area of usage was geography. To orient was used transitively – not reflexively as it is now. It meant “partitioning a map in a certain manner.”
This subtle change away from reflexivity shows the way towards a different understanding of orientation. It points towards a more active role for POCs in laying claim to concrete universality.
So, while Kant universalizes the particular subjectivities into an intersubjective universality, we should by now have realized that we need to orient universality towards us. We need to undo the reflexivity Kant gave the word “to orient” and turn it back into the transitive, active verb it used to be. Hence at the end of this talk we arrive at a slight modification of its title. It now says: How to Orient Oneself in White Jurisprudence.
* Bucerius Law School, Hamburg.
 Wallace, “Authority and American Usage”, in id., Consider the Lobster and Other Essays (2005), 108–109.
 See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1977), § 12, 71 ff.
 I take the term from Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), 96.
 For an explanation of how to one arrives at such a patchwork and how it can be utilised, using the example of law, see Augsberg, Die Lesbarkeit des Rechts (2009), 62 who in turn references Schuppert, Staatswissenschaft (2003), 5.
 Rorty (n 3), 73.
 I am taking the term from the French legal philosopher Pierre Legendre, as used in e. g. Legendre, Leçon IX: L’autre bible de l’Occident (2009), 54.
 Zalloua, Žižek on Race (2020), 4 quoting Žižek, Violence (2008), 72 and referring to Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs (1952).
 Fanon (n 7), 88 [all translations from French are my own unless otherwise specified].
 Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 8 Feminist Theory 157 (2007).
 Foucault, L’ordre du discours (1971), 10–11.
 Žižek, “Foreword,” in Zalloua (n 7), x.
 Zalloua (n 7), 9.
 Id., 7.
 Žižek (n 12), xi.
 Žižek, Less Than Nothing (2012), 359 [emphasis in original].
 Žižek (n 16), 362 [emphasis in original].
 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! (1992), 84, referring to Kierkegaardian ethics.
 Zalloua (n 7), 9.
 Id., 150.
 Žižek, The Parallax View (2006), 34.
 Zalloua (n 7), 150 quoting Žižek (n 7), 152 [emphasis in original].
 For a detailed and helpful description of German jurisprudence, see Bumke, Rechtsdogmatik (2017) where an exhaustive overview of classic and newer literature concerning Rechtsdogmatik can be found.
 Famously, that was the law’s central function for Luhmann – it stabilizes normative expectations. See e. g. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995), 131 ff.
 As explored in Lepsius, “Kritik der Dogmatik,” in Was weiß Dogmatik? (Kirchhof & Magen & Schneider eds., 2012), 60.
 German jurisprudence’s tendency for “ontologisms” has recently been laid out concisely by Dubber, The Dual Penal State (2018), 34–35.
 For a description of these processes and how a modern, critical jurisprudence might deal with them see Becker & Sow, “Eppur si muove,” in Kafka (Ortmann & Schuller eds., 2019), 235–259.
 Zalloua (n 7), 116 quoting Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009), 120.
 Žižek (n 30).
 Vogl & Wolf, “Angst und Prävention,” in Wörterbuch der Gegenwart (Scherer & von Schubert & Aue eds., 2019), 42–48.
 Id., 43.
 Id., 44.
 A newer German legal philosophical movement is increasingly emphasizing this imperialistic nature of law, see e. g. the chapters in Augsberg & Augsberg & Heidbrink (eds.), Recht auf Nicht-Recht (2020).
 Some German jurists have long raised the dangers of this process, most centrally perhaps by Poscher who gives an overview of the literature dealing with this process in Poscher, “Eingriffsschwellen im Recht der inneren Sicherheit,” 41 Die Verwaltung 345 (2008).
 This centrality of “danger” is codified on a federal level in § 14 Bundespolizeigesetz and is reiterated in the respective state laws (e. g. in § 3 Hamburgisches Gesetz zum Schutz der Öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung).
 Žižek (n 12), xii.
 Unfortunately, no English translation can avoid adding a certain awkwardness to Kant’s title that is not present at all in the German original.
 Hutchings, “What is Orientation in Thinking?,” 18 Constellations 192 (2011).
 Kant, “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?,” in Wood & di Giovanni (eds.), Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (2nd ed., 2018), 5.
 Huber, “Wiedergelesen: Kants Orientierungsversuch für ein Globales Zeitalter,” Theorieblog [Internet]. 2014 [accessed 2020 Jul 20] https://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2014/04/wiedergelesen-kants-orientierungsversuch-fuer-ein-globales-zeitalter/. Huber provides us with a helpful and accessible description of Kant’s switch from the spatial, to the theoretical, and ultimately to the political.
 Naturally here one might also raise the point of Kant’s racist anthropology (see Eze, “The Color of Reason,” in id., Postcolonial African Philosophy (1997), 103–131) to supplement my point of Kantian orientation being a “white” endeavor.
 Ahmed (n 9), 154 [emphasis in original].
 See Stegmaier, “›Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?‹”, 17 Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 4 (1992).
Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 8 Feminist Theory 149 (2007).
Augsberg & Augsberg & Heidbrink (eds.), Recht auf Nicht-Recht (2020).
Augsberg, Die Lesbarkeit des Rechts (2009).
Becker & Sow, “Eppur si muove,” in Kafka (Ortmann & Schuller eds., 2019), 235–259.
Bumke, Rechtsdogmatik (2017).
Dubber, The Dual Penal State (2018).
Eze, “The Color of Reason,” in id., Postcolonial African Philosophy (1997), 103–131.
Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs (1952).
Foucault, L’ordre du discours (1971).
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1977).
Huber, “Wiedergelesen: Kants Orientierungsversuch für ein Globales Zeitalter,” Theorieblog, 2014.
Hutchings, “What is Orientation in Thinking?,” 18 Constellations 190 (2011).
Kant, “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?,” in Wood & di Giovanni (eds.), Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (2nd ed., 2018), 5 ff.
Legendre, Leçon IX: L’autre bible de l’Occident (2009).
Lepsius, “Kritik der Dogmatik,” in Was weiß Dogmatik? (Kirchhof & Magen & Schneider eds., 2012), 39–62.
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995).
Poscher, “Eingriffsschwellen im Recht der inneren Sicherheit,” 41 Die Verwaltung 345 (2008).
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989).
Schuppert, Staatswissenschaft (2003).
Stegmaier, “›Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?‹”, 17 Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1 (1992).
Vogl & Wolf, “Angst und Prävention,” in Wörterbuch der Gegenwart (Scherer & von Schubert & Aue eds., 2019), 42–48.
Wallace, “Authority and American Usage”, in id., Consider the Lobster and Other Essays (2005), 66-127.
Zalloua, Žižek on Race (2020).
Žižek, “Foreword,” in Zalloua, Žižek on Race (2020).
Žižek, “Learn to Live without Masters,” Naked Punch, 2009.
Žižek, “Tolerance as an Ideological Category,” Critical Inquiry, 2007.
Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! (1992).
Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009).
Žižek, Less Than Nothing (2012).
Žižek, The Parallax View (2006).
Žižek, Violence (2008).